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LAW SUMMARY 
A Delicate Balancing of Paternalism and 
Freedom to Contract:  
The Evolving Law of Unconscionability in 
Missouri  
SCOTT LEE SMITHSON, JR.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The contracts defense of unconscionability – infrequently exercised and 
less frequently successful – requires that a contractual provision be so odious 
that it “shocks the conscience” of the adjudicator.1  Case law suggests that 
during the last century, unconscionability has been argued successfully less 
than twenty times in the state of Missouri.2  The nature of an overall uncon-
scionability analysis is rather tenuous, given that the defense is highly fact-
intensive, and a range of factors, rather than elements, controls.3  Despite this, 
Missouri courts had applied a uniform test in nearly every contract situation 
for decades, including contracts whose terms included a mandatory arbitra-
tion clause.   
After the adjudication of the highly anticipated case AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion,4 the Missouri judiciary was faced with the prospect of 
examining its own unconscionability test and applying the new ruling.  The 
Concepcion case, decided within the context of mandatory arbitration con-
tracts, held that state unconscionability laws will be pre-empted by the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act where such state unconscionability laws stand as an ob-
stacle to the goals of the Federal Arbitration Act.  Along with providing a 
  
 * Bachelor of Science in Business Administration with emphasis in Finance 
and Banking, University of Missouri (2009); J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law (2013); Layout and Design Editor, Missouri Law Review (2012-13).  
I’d like to thank my fiancée, Colleen Walsh, for her unending love and support during 
my journey throughout law school.  Many thanks to my family for always believing 
in me.  Finally, thank you to Professor Royce Barondes for introducing me to uncon-
scionability and providing a basis for this article.  All errors are mine.  
 1. Carter v. Boone Cnty. Trust Co., 92 S.W.2d 647, 657 (Mo. 1935) (en banc). 
 2. See infra Parts II.A, C. 
 3. See, e.g., Whitney v. Alltell Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 309 (Mo. 
App. W.D. 2005) (noting that a finding of unconscionability should be “based upon 
the totality of the circumstances”). 
 4. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  
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general history of Missouri unconscionability law, this Summary will also 
examine the major impact of Concepcion upon the state.  
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The unconscionability doctrine is rooted in legal precepts dating to the 
late 1900s, but the defense has only become widespread in Missouri during 
the last ten years or so.5  The Legal Background section will investigate the 
beginnings of the defense in Missouri, examine the formation of the old and 
new unconscionability tests (including a brief overview of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act), and provide a general overview of the most important Missouri 
unconscionability cases. 
A.  Unconscionability Generally 
1.  The Origin of the Defense 
The first judicial definition of “unconscionability” in United States his-
tory appears in Hume v. United States, a Supreme Court of the United States 
case decided in 1889.6  Hume colorfully illustrates an unconscionable agree-
ment as one that “no man in his senses, not under delusion, would make, on 
the one hand, and which no fair and honest man would accept on the 
other[.]”7  The first Missouri court case to mention the concept came two 
decades later in Ball v. Reyburn, where the court adopted the same defini-
tion.8  Thereafter, Missouri courts applied a fact-specific analysis to uncon-
scionability claims, resulting in several independent rulings9 that offered little 
basis for reliable precedent.10 
For example, in Carter v. Boone County Trust, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri determined the validity of an agreed-upon rental value for “the most 
  
 5. See infra Parts II.A, C.   
 6. 21 Ct. Cl. 328, aff’d, 132 U.S. 406 (1889).  The case involved an agreement 
between Hume and the United States government, oddly resulting in the govern-
ment’s contractual obligation to purchase “shucks” from Hume for $1,200 a ton, 
when the going market rate for shucks was no more than $35 per ton.  Id. at 329-30.  
The court struck down the agreement as unconscionable.  Id. at 332. 
 7. Id. at 330 (quoting BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY). 
 8. 118 S.W. 524 (Mo. App. W.D. 1909).  The court refused to rule that the 
contract was unconscionable.  Id. at 524-25.  The court reaffirmed this definition 
several months later in Wenninger v. Mitchell, 122 S.W. 1130, 1132 (Mo. App. W.D. 
1909).     
 9. See Carter v. Boone Cnty. Trust Co., 92 S.W.2d 647, 658 (Mo. 1935) (en 
banc); Wenninger, 122 S.W. at 1132; Ball, 118 S.W. at 524-25. 
 10. Oldham’s Farm Sausage Co. v. Salco, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 177, 182 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 1982) (describing judicial precedent on unconscionability in Missouri as 
“scant”). 
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valuable business property in Columbia[, Missouri].”11  The plaintiff argued 
that the contracted rental price for the property paid by Boone County Trust 
was “so inadequate” that it should have “shock[ed] the conscience of the 
court” and have been set aside.12  
In addressing the plaintiff’s claim, the court first referenced the treatise 
Page on Contracts and produced the definition for unconscionability noted in 
Hume.13  Additionally, the opinion concluded that the threshold for determin-
ing whether unequal consideration might qualify as “unconscionable” could 
only be stated in “abstract terms” and thus offered no practical help.14  Turn-
ing to alternative definitions of unconscionability, the court stated, “where the 
inadequacy of price is so great that the mind revolts at it, the [c]ourt will lay 
hold of the slightest circumstances of oppression or advantage to rescind the 
contract.”15  Finally, the Carter opinion revisited a rule that was “everywhere 
understood” – if a party was incompetent to understand the nature of the con-
tract, or if it was necessary to otherwise guard and protect the rights of a 
party, courts would interfere on that party’s behalf.16  Beyond these maxims, 
the court applied no other test in ultimately finding that the contracted rental 
price was not unconscionable.17  
Other early Missouri unconscionability decisions conducted similar 
analyses.18  However, in the 1955 case Miller v. Coffeen, a Missouri court 
struck down a contractual agreement using reasons similar to the modern 
unconscionability defense.19  The matter involved two private individuals 
engaged in a sale of real property.20  Miller21 contracted with a seventy-year-
old seller, Coffeen,22 for the sale of a home located in Kansas City.23  The 
home had a fair market value somewhere between $11,000 and $12,000.24  
  
 11. Carter, 92 S.W.2d at 658. 
 12. Id. at 656. 
 13. Id. at 657 (citation omitted) (“An unconscionable contract is said to be one 
‘such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on the one hand, 
and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.’”). 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  The court also referenced the “shock the conscience” standard. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 658.  
 18. See cases cite supra note 9. 
 19. 280 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1955) (en banc). 
 20. Id. at 102.  
 21. Miller, described as having “superior natural acuteness” compared to Cof-
feen, held a “very responsible” position with the Pacific railroad, and completed 
schooling throughout the sixth grade.  Id. at 104.  
 22. Coffeen was largely uneducated, but did finish grammar school and attended 
night school for several months.  Id. 
 23. Id. at 103-04. 
 24. Id.  
3
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Coffeen offered to sell Miller the home for $2,400.25  A day after the papers 
were executed, and after consulting with his lawyer, Coffeen expressed his 
desire to back out of the sale.26  The two parties attempted to reach a mone-
tary figure upon which Coffeen could pay to be relieved of his contractual 
obligations to sell the home.27  Unsatisfied with the negotiations, Miller initi-
ated legal action and stated his desire that the trial court enforce the sale 
through specific performance.28  
The trial court rendered a verdict for Miller, and Coffeen appealed.29  
On review, the Supreme Court of Missouri examined the facts of the case, 
commenting on several factors surrounding the formation of the contract.30  
First, the court noted that Miller had intimate knowledge of Coffeen’s prop-
erty, including the sale price of $12,000 that Coffeen originally paid for the 
property.31  Second, Coffeen’s lawyer stated at trial that “[Coffeen] didn’t 
know what he was doing,” and he “ought to be adjudicated [incompetent].”32  
Finally, the court noted that in addition to Miller’s knowledge of the fair 
value of the property, the parties “did not negotiate and consummate their 
contract alone and on equal terms.”33  In fact, Miller declined to use Cof-
feen’s lawyer for the sale, and the parties subsequently visited Miller’s per-
sonal attorney.34  Without counseling Coffeen in any way, Miller’s attorney 
examined the property’s papers and drafted a purchase agreement that was 
signed immediately.35  
In making its decision, the court discussed strong Missouri precedent 
regarding specific performance.36  Particularly, the court observed that absent 
circumstances that would make the contract “unfair, overreaching, [or] bit-
ing,” and in situations where a contract’s terms are plain and fair, a specific 
performance remedy is generally a matter of right.37  Also, mere inadequacy 
in value between the property and the sale price is not a ground for refusing 
specific performance unless it is accompanied by other inequitable factors, 
including “the fairness and reasonableness of the consideration in view of all 
  
 25. Id. at 105.  Coffeen first offered to sell the home for $2100.  Id. at 104.  
 26. Id. at 105. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 102. 
 29. Id.   
 30. Id. at 102-03. 
 31. Id. at 103-04.  Coffeen purchased the property only twelve days prior to 
entering into the transaction with Miller.  Id. 
 32. Id. at 105.  Although Coffeen’s attorney made this claim, and although it was 
mentioned in the opinion, the court did not conclude that Coffeen was mentally in-
competent to enter into a contract.  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 102-04. 
 37. Id. at 102. 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss1/8
File: SmithsonPaginated.docx Created on: 10/21/13 10:20 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:12 PM 
2013] UNCONSCIONABILITY 325 
 
the circumstances.”38  The judicial system values the importance of enforcing 
contracts voluntarily entered into, even if they are a “hard one,”39 but the 
Coffeen court clearly believed the circumstances of the case rose to such a 
level as to render specific performance unavailable as a remedy.40  Consider-
ing the facts of the case, and that various other damage remedies for breach 
were available to Miller (who had not yet suffered an adverse financial 
change of position due to the sale),41 the court concluded that, “in view of the 
shocking inadequacy of the consideration and the presence of the noted ineq-
uitable factors, enforcement of the contract would impose an unreasonable, 
disproportionate hardship upon [Coffeen].”42  Therefore, the court denied 
Miller’s request to mandate the sale of property through specific perform-
ance.43  
Although Coffeen did not specifically mention unconscionability, the 
modern framework for the defense is derived from the reasoning in that 
case.44  The factors applied by the Coffeen court, including unequal bargain-
ing power and oppressive terms,45 stand as the basis in Missouri for both pro-
cedural and substantive unconscionability analyses seen in modern day 
courts. 
2.  The Missouri Approach 
The first Missouri case to establish the modern “substantive and proce-
dural unconscionability” test appeared in Funding Systems Leasing Corpora-
tion v. King Louie International, Inc.46  King Louie involved a dispute be-
tween several parties over the effect of a liability disclaimer in a lease-
purchase agreement for equipment that subsequently malfunctioned.47 The 
trial court entered judgment against King Louie.48  On appeal, King Louie 
argued, among other things, that the express liability disclaimer was uncon-
scionable.49  
  
 38. Id. at 103.  
 39. Id. at 101 (noting that courts will enforce contracts even where those con-
tracts produce unfair or unwanted results). 
 40. Id. at 106.  
 41. Id.  The court made it clear that “there was no possible loss to [Miller]” that 
could not have been recoverable as damages for breach of contract.  Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 45. See Miller, 280 S.W.2d at 103. 
 46. 597 S.W.2d 624, 633-34 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979). 
 47. Id. at 626-29. 
 48. Id. at 629.  
 49. Id. 
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The court of appeals inferred that, in order to find unconscionability, a 
proper definition of the defense would be necessary to investigate the claim.50 
Noting that the Uniform Commercial Code offered no definition,51 the major-
ity referenced a test proposed in a 1967 University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view article52 that had been accepted by various legal commentators and New 
York courts.53  The test distinguished between two facets of unconscionabil-
ity: “substantive” and “procedural.”54  According to the court of appeals, the 
substantive aspect related to “undue harshness” in the actual terms of the 
contract.55  An unduly harsh term might provide for the total destruction of 
the right to relief in case of breach.56  The procedural portion related to prob-
lems in the contract formation process, such as unequal bargaining power 
between the parties57, high-pressure tactics, fine print, and misrepresenta-
tion.58  
The King Louie majority established that in order for an unconscionabil-
ity claim to succeed, there must generally be both substantive and procedural 
aspects to the claim.59 However, a sliding scale was also introduced.60  The 
sliding scale evaluation permits a court to find a term unconscionable even if, 
for example, there is little substantive unconscionability but the procedural 
  
 50. See id. at 633-34. 
 51. Id. at 633.  The UCC does offer a “test.”  U.C.C. § 2-302 (2011).  According 
to the official comment to U.C.C. § 2-302, “the basic test is whether, in the light of 
the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade 
or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the cir-
cumstances existing at the time of making the contract.”  Id. cmt. 1.  The test is rather 
circular in nature as “the basic test [for deciding if a term is unconscionable] is 
whether . . . the term or contract involved is so one-sided as to be unconscionable.” 
See id.  Therefore, the King Louie court pursued other options.  King Louie, 597 
S.W.2d at 633-34.    
 52. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s 
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
 53. King Louie, 597 S.W.2d at 633-34. 
 54. Id. at 634 (citing Leff, supra note 52). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Starline Overseas Corp., 346 
N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. App. Term 1973) (noting that the parties involved were 
“well-advised, alert, knowledgeable business men” dealing at arm’s length). 
 58. King Louie, 597 S.W.2d at 634.  
 59. Id. (citing SINAI DEUTCH, UNFAIR CONTRACTS:  THE DOCTRINE OF 
UNCONSCIONABILITY (1976)); see also Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 
531 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (noting that under Missouri law, a contractual provision 
will not be deemed unconscionable unless elements of both substantive and proce-
dural unconscionability are present). 
 60. King Louie, 597 S.W.2d at 635. 
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elements are overwhelming.61  Thus, in a typical contract, if procedural fac-
tors of unconscionability are grossly inequitable, the relative absence of un-
duly harsh terms in the contract could still warrant a finding that the contract 
is unconscionable. However, the reverse is generally untrue; a claim of un-
conscionability will almost assuredly fail where aspects of procedural uncon-
scionability are missing.62  
Although the court in King Louie did not ultimately find the applicable 
contract provision unconscionable,63 the reasoning in the case has proven to 
be a watershed moment in Missouri unconscionability law.  As we will see, 
the reasoning adopted by King Louie became the judicial touchstone.64 The 
following case exemplifies that the King Louie opinion was also applied in 
situations where one corporate entity contracted with another.    
Oldham’s Farm Sausage Company v. Salco, Inc. is a rare Missouri case 
in which the court found a term to be unconscionable in a contract between 
two corporate entities.65  The twenty-eight-page contract involved the sale of 
a refrigeration system.66  The plaintiff/buyer, Oldham’s, sought $200,000 in 
damages against the defendant/seller, Salco, for breach of contract and breach 
  
 61. Id. at 634 (citing John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Prob-
lems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969)). 
 62. See Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 25-26 (Mo. 2010) (en 
banc) (Price, C.J., dissenting) (“Courts are . . . hesitant to substitute their judgment for 
that of freely acting parties. That is why a showing of procedural unconscionability is 
necessary – it flags circumstances in which one of the parties may not have freely 
consented to the bargain.”), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011) (mem.); cf. State ex rel. 
Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (exemplifying the first 
case in Missouri history where the Supreme Court of Missouri struck an arbitration 
agreement on the basis of substantive unconscionability alone).   
 63. King Louie, 597 S.W.2d at 636.  The court held that “a finding here of un-
conscionability would be contrary to the weight of the evidence[.]”  Id. 
 64. See Brewer, 364 S.W.3d at 500 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (Price, J., dissenting) 
(citing King Louie, 597 S.W.2d at 633-34) (stating that “[t]raditional unconscionabil-
ity law in Missouri requires a showing that the contract is both procedurally and sub-
stantively unconscionable”); Bracey v. Monsanto Co., 823 S.W.2d 946, 952-53 (Mo. 
1992) (en banc) (noting that although there was “little” Missouri case law on uncon-
scionability, King Louie provided the framework); Woods v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 
S.W.3d 90, 94-95 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008) (citing King Louie, 597 S.W.2d at 634, to 
distinguish between substantive and procedural unconscionability); Whitney v. Alltel 
Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 308-09 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005) (citing King Louie, 
597 S.W.2d at 634, to distinguish between procedural and substantive unconscionabil-
ity); Liberty Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40, 
50 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984) (citing King Louie, 597 S.W.2d at 634); Oldham’s Farm 
Sausage Co. v. Salco, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 177, 182 n.5 (Mo. App. W.D. 1982) (analo-
gizing from King Louie to determine whether a contractual clause statutorily uncon-
scionable). 
 65. 633 S.W.2d at 178.  The most common scenario warranting a finding of 
unconscionability seems to be between a consumer and a corporate entity.   
 66. Id. at 179.  
7
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of express and implied warranties.67  The trial court held for Oldham’s, and 
Salco appealed.68  Salco argued that warranty disclaimers within the contract 
effectively neutralized any express or implied warranties, and also that a 
“limitation of liability” clause excluded consequential damages (which con-
stituted a huge portion of the damages award).69  
The court of appeals first noted that the warranty disclaimers and the 
limitation of liability clause were both classic examples of “burying some-
thing in fine print,”70 and because of that, the majority would not give effect 
to the warranty disclaimers.71  Turning to the limitation of liability, the opin-
ion stated that parties may exclude consequential damages so long as the ex-
clusion is not unconscionable.72  However, applying the King Louie factors, 
the court found this clause to be problematic.73 
First, the limitation on liability was written in fine print amongst many 
other technical provisions on the backside of the signature page.74  The court 
held that such a clause could surely present unfair surprise, and largely satis-
fied the procedural element of an unconscionability analysis.75  Next, the 
court reviewed the practical effect of enforcing the consequential damages 
exclusion.76  The trial court damages award of $214,167.45 largely consisted 
of consequential damages – without them, the total would have been only 
$4,422.27.77  Unsatisfied with that result, the majority stated that: 
“[I]t is the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum 
adequate remedies be available.” . . . [Enforcing the provision] can 
hardly be said to be a “minimum adequate remedy” for the myriad 
losses and costs suffered by [Oldham’s] from the constant and 
long-term malfunctioning of the [refrigerator].78   
Thus, because the limitation on liability was unduly harsh, it met the 
threshold for substantive unconscionability.79  Given that the limitation provi-
  
 67. Id. at 178.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 181. 
 71. Id. at 182. 
 72. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 400.2-719(3)). 
 73. Id. at 183 (“[T]he consequential damages exclusionary clause here was un-
conscionable and will not be allowed.”). 
 74. Id. at 182. 
 75. Id. at 182-83 (citing Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int’l, Inc., 
597 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979)). 
 76. See id. at 183.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 400.2-719 cmt. 1). 
 79. See id. 
8
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sion satisfied both the procedural and substantive aspects of unconscionabil-
ity, the majority struck it as unconscionable.80 
Looking to case law, it is evident that any number of reasons could lead 
a court to conclude that a particular contractual term is unconscionable.  The 
previous cases involved “shocking” inadequacies of consideration, the denial 
of particular kinds of relief, and the enforcement of waiver provisions.  Since 
the year 2003, however, a major surge of unconscionability rulings has 
sprung up in Missouri revolving around a solitary issue: mandatory arbitra-
tion provisions in consumer contracts.  The legal background of those cases, 
in addition to the aforementioned history of early unconscionability cases in 
Missouri, provides a foundation for understanding the current state of uncon-
scionability law in Missouri.  But first, it is necessary to review the Federal 
Arbitration Act, which provides a crucial backdrop for this new wave of rul-
ings.  
B.  The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)81 
The Federal Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925 by Congress primarily 
to set agreements to arbitrate “on equal footing” with other contractual 
agreements.82  In other words, the goal was to prevent judiciaries from refus-
ing to enforce arbitration agreements solely because they perceived arbitra-
tion as a less-desirable method of dispute resolution.83  Lately, the importance 
of one particular section within the FAA has increased mightily – chapter 1, 
section 2.84  
This section indicates that arbitration agreements should be enforced 
“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”85  This line, known as section 2’s “savings clause,” has been inter-
  
 80. See id. 
 81. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006). 
 82. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12, 423 
(1967) (making arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts).  The High 
Court still aims to achieve this goal.  See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443-44 (2006). 
 83. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (quoting Buck-
eye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 443) (stating that the FAA was instituted in 
response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements); Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 265 (1995) (noting that “the Act has the 
basic purpose of overcoming judicial hostility to arbitration agreements”). 
 84. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 85. Id.  The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that federal 
policy favors arbitration, and issues regarding the scope of arbitration shall also be 
resolved in favor of arbitration.  See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 
514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989) (stating that federal policy favors arbitration); 
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1983) (stat-
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preted by courts to mean that although the Act is federal in nature, it will 
apply to states, and state law contract principles may invalidate arbitration 
agreements.86  The savings clause purports to “give[] States a method for 
protecting consumers against unfair pressure to agree to a contract with an 
unwanted arbitration provision.”87  To that end, courts have historically ap-
plied traditional contract principles such as fraud, duress, and unconscionabil-
ity to invalidate arbitration agreements.88  Missouri, in particular, has utilized 
its general unconscionability test to nullify several arbitration agreements 
over the past decade.89  Some of those cases are examined below.  
C.  The “Arbitration Era” of Missouri Unconscionability Cases 
From 1909-2002, a span of nearly a century, only a handful of Missouri 
cases struck down a contract clause as unconscionable.90  However, since 
Swain v. Auto Services, Inc. was handed down in 2003,91 Missouri courts 
have declared certain contract clauses as unconscionable on an almost annual 
basis.  Each ruling finding unconscionability since Swain has involved man-
datory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.  The reasoning in these cases 
provides a framework for understanding some of the most current issues re-
lating to unconscionability law today.  
Swain v. Auto Services, Inc. involved the enforceability of an arbitration 
clause existing in a car-servicing plan provided by the company Auto Serv-
ices.92  After Auto Services refused to pay for certain car repairs that Swain 
believed were covered by the plan, Swain sued to enforce the servicing plan 
in a St. Louis Circuit Court.93  Auto Services brought a motion to compel 
arbitration that the trial court denied.94  On appeal, the Eastern District looked 
to the circumstances of the case to determine what would and would not be 
enforceable.95  
The court first noted that because the contract involved parties in differ-
ent states, and therefore interstate commerce, the FAA pre-empted Missouri 
  
ing that issues regarding scope of arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion). 
 86. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984) (holding that the FAA 
was designed to apply in both federal and state courts).  
 87. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 281. 
 88. Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 340 S.W.3d 126, 130 
(Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 
103, 107 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003)). 
 89. See infra Part II.C. 
 90. See supra Part II.A. 
 91. 128 S.W.3d 103.  
 92. Id. at 105.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 105-06. 
 95. See id. at 107-08. 
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arbitration law on the matter.96  The majority declared that although the FAA 
would control, “generally applicable [common law] contract defenses, such 
as . . . unconscionability may be used to invalidate arbitration agreements 
without contravening the FAA.”97  Examining the factors surrounding the 
case, the court stated that because Auto Services was a corporation, and be-
cause Swain was an individual consumer, the bargaining power was per se 
unequal.98  Also, the plan was offered on a pre-printed form, virtually all of 
the terms were non-negotiable,99 no other warranties were available for the 
car Swain purchased, and he was not told of the arbitration clause prior to 
signing.100  The arbitration clause also stated that all disputes would be re-
solved via arbitration in Arkansas (although Swain was from Missouri).101  
Based on these facts, the court ascertained that the contract was one of adhe-
sion.102  
However, the Eastern District stated that such pre-printed, non-
negotiable contracts are not “‘inherently sinister and automatically unen-
forceable,’” and that broadly outlawing the enforceability of pre-printed con-
tracts would be “‘completely unworkable.’”103  Rather, only the “reasonable 
expectations of the parties” would be enforced.104  The majority stated that an 
average consumer could reasonably expect that such contracts include arbitra-
tion as a means of dispute resolution,105 but an average consumer would not 
expect that he would have to leave his own state to do so.106  The venue selec-
tion clause was unconscionably unfair because it limited Auto Service’s obli-
gations and was unduly harsh on any non-Arkansas consumer.107  After not-
ing that an unconscionable term of a contract may simply be severed if it is 
  
 96. Id. at 106. 
 97. Id. at 107.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  The length of service was negotiable.  Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 105.  
 102. Id. at 107.  Under Missouri arbitration law, a contract of adhesion is not 
enforceable. Missouri Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA), MO. REV. STAT. § 435.350 
(2000).  However, under the FAA, contracts of adhesion do not receive the same 
treatment, and may be enforceable.  See Swain, 128 S.W.3d at 106, 106 n.2. 
 103. Swain, 128 S.W.3d at 107 (quoting Heartland Computer Leasing Corp. v. 
Ins. Man, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989). 
 104. Id. (citing Hartland Computer Leasing Corp., 770 S.W.2d at 527-28). 
 105. Id. at 107-08 (“An agreement choosing arbitration over litigation, even be-
tween parties of unequal bargaining power, is not unconscionably unfair.”). 
 106. Id. (“An average consumer purchasing a car in Missouri would not reasona-
bly expect that any disputes arising under the service plain accompanying the car 
would have to be resolved in another state.”). 
 107. Id. 
11
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not essential to the entire agreement,108 the court of appeals decided to do just 
that and otherwise enforced the arbitration provision.109  
Two years later, the Missouri Court of Appeals considered another un-
conscionability argument in Whitney v. Alltel Communications, Inc..110  
Whitney brought a class action to challenge the lawfulness of an eighty-eight 
cent monthly charge for Alltel customers.111  However, sometime during the 
course of Whitney and Alltel’s business relationship, Alltel changed its serv-
ice agreement to include a mandatory arbitration clause that contained a class 
action bar.112  Alltel moved to compel arbitration, and Whitney countered by 
declaring the arbitration clause to be in violation of the Merchandising Prac-
tices Act (MPA), which guarantees consumers certain rights, including the 
ability to bring a class action lawsuit and seek attorney fees.113 The trial court 
agreed with Whitney, and Alltel appealed.114  
On appeal, the Western District first briefly addressed the procedural 
unconscionability issue.115  The court determined that aspects of procedural 
unconscionability were sufficiently present, referencing Alltel’s “superior 
bargaining position,” the fact that the arbitration provision was “sent to Whit-
ney in the mail on a take it or leave it basis” without any chance of negotia-
tion, and that the arbitration provision was inserted in fine print on the back 
side of a sheet sent with Whitney’s monthly bill.116 
The court then turned to the issue of substantive unconscionability.117  
The opinion noted that Whitney was statutorily granted special protective 
rights under Missouri’s MPA.118  Thus, when an arbitration agreement effec-
tively deprives a consumer of his statutory rights, the agreement may be in-
validated.119  In this case, the arbitration agreement barred class actions (a 
type of relief expressly granted to consumers by the MPA) and required each 
party to bear the costs of arbitration (while the MPA allowed for the recovery 
of attorney’s fees).120  The court then stated that at the time of filing suit, 
  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 109. 
 110. See 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  
 111. Whitney, 173 S.W.3d at 304. 
 112. Id.  The alteration was sent in the mail, and stated that a customer accepted 
the term changes by continuing to use the services provided by Alltel.  Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 304-05.  
 115. Id. at 310. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 311. 
 119. Id. (“In some instances, where [an] arbitration provision is so prohibitive as 
to effectively deprive a party of his or her statutory rights, the arbitration agreement 
may be invalidated.” (citing Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 So. 2d 529 (Ala. 
2002))).  
 120. Id. at 313. 
12
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Whitney had personally been billed a total of $24.64.121 Even if Whitney took 
the case to an arbitrator and won, “the award could not possibly approach the 
amount that would have to be expended” throughout the arbitration proc-
ess.122  The costs associated with such action made it impractical for any All-
tel customer to challenge the eighty-eight cent charge as a violation of the 
MPA.123  The court noted that enforcing the arbitration provision would en-
able Alltel to collect millions of dollars from allegedly improper billing prac-
tices, all while insulating the company from liability because of the prohibi-
tive costs needed to put a stop to the conduct.124 
The Whitney court turned to the “reasonable expectation” standard pre-
sented in Swain, and declared that no Alltel customer would reasonably ex-
pect to spend potentially thousands of dollars to combat an eighty-eight cent 
claim.125  In conclusion, the court held that enforcing the class action bar 
would be unconscionable and in direct conflict with the public policy of the 
MPA.126  The arbitration agreement was unenforceable.127   
The final pre-Concepcion arbitration case pitted a title loan borrower 
against her lender in Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc. (I).128  Brewer took 
out a $2,215 loan on her car from Missouri Title Loans, and the accompany-
ing paperwork included an agreement to arbitrate individually.129  The 
agreement expressly prohibited class arbitration.130  Brewer subsequently 
attempted to file a class action based on allegations that Missouri Title Loans 
had, inter alia, violated the MPA.131  Missouri Title Loans filed a motion to 
compel individual arbitration, but the trial court denied it and declared the 
arbitration agreement to be unconscionable.132  Missouri Title Loans ap-
pealed.133  
When the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case,134 it first began 
by reiterating that parties must agree to arbitrate.135  By putting a class waiver 
  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 313-14.  
 123. Id. at 314. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc. (Brewer I), 323 S.W.3d 18, 20 (Mo. 2010) 
(en banc), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011) (mem.).    
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  Brewer claimed to suffer at least $4,000 in damages by herself due to 
Missouri Title Loans’ conduct.  Id. at 27 (Price, C.J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. at 20 (majority opinion). 
 133. Id. at 19. 
 134. The case was received on transfer from the Missouri Court of Appeals.  
Id. 
13
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into the arbitration agreement, Missouri Title Loans explicitly signaled that it 
would not agree to such a remedy.136  However, the court noted, that did not 
mean Brewer was forced to arbitrate her matter individually.137  It simply 
meant that class arbitration was not an option in this case.138  
In its unconscionability analysis, the majority discussed basic Missouri 
precedent.139  However, it also reached a new conclusion seen only once be-
fore in Missouri.  The opinion stated that a previous Missouri unconscionabil-
ity case, State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider,140 stood for the proposition that a 
clause could be found unconscionable based on either procedural or substan-
tive grounds, or a combination of both.141 Despite such declaration, the ma-
jority continued to find the presence of both procedural and substantive un-
conscionability.142  On the procedural side, the court stated that the non-
negotiable nature of the agreement, as well as the superior bargaining power 
held by Missouri Title Loans added to the unconscionability of the con-
tract.143  The majority also pointed out that the average consumer would have 
been unable to understand the terms of the agreement, and the high-interest 
loan agreement was offered to the financially-distressed on a “take-it or 
leave-it” basis.144 Based upon those factors, the Brewer (I) court held that the 
procedural aspect of the test was satisfied.145  
The majority then listed the substantive unconscionable aspects of the 
agreement.146  First, three experts testified that it would have been incredibly 
difficult for Brewer to obtain counsel for her individually arbitrated claim.147  
The arbitration agreement, by limiting Brewer’s ability to obtain representa-
tion, left her without a “meaningful avenue of redress[]” in pursuing such a 
complicated claim.148  Second, the class arbitration waiver essentially gave 
Missouri Title Loans the ability to wrongfully extract small sums from thou-
  
 135. Id. at 20 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 
1758, 1774-75 (2010)). 
 136. Id. at 21.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 22.  
 140. 194 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 141. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 22 (noting that although the Vincent court did not 
explicitly state that a Missouri court could find unconscionability based solely upon 
substantive factors, the analysis relating to the facts in Vincent appears to suggest the 
court did just that).  This holding is important in Missouri’s new unconscionability 
test, discussed below.  
 142. Id. at 23. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
14
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sands of customers without fear of liability.149  Because the agreement elimi-
nated any “practical remedy to bring about a stop to the conduct,” the major-
ity struck the entire arbitration agreement as unconscionable.150 
In a heated dissent, Chief Justice Ray Price condemned the majority’s 
statement that Vincent eradicated the requirement that procedural uncon-
scionability must be found in order to find a clause unconscionable.151 In-
stead, he argued that Vincent merely exemplified a court’s power to “blue 
pencil” contractual provisions that imposed “unreasonable limitations” on a 
contract that would be otherwise reasonable.152  
Chief Justice Price also argued that neither elements of procedural nor 
substantive unconscionability were present in Brewer (I).153  Although Price 
conceded that Missouri Title Loans had a superior bargaining position and 
that the non-negotiable agreement was offered on a “take it or leave it” basis, 
Price maintained that those facts were not prima facie proof of procedural 
unconscionability.154  Rather, Missouri unconscionability precedent required 
the plaintiff to show that she was unable to look elsewhere for a more attrac-
tive contract.155  In that respect, Brewer offered no evidence.156  In a self-
defeating move, Brewer previously did offer proof that twenty competing 
companies could have provided her with the same service and may have had 
different contractual terms.157  Additionally, Brewer’s ignorance to the arbi-
tration terms provided her with no valid defense.158  
The dissent continued by arguing that substantive unconscionability was 
not shown.159 First, the amount in controversy was over $4,000 and currently 
accruing interest.160  Such an amount would surely garner representation from 
a lawyer in individual arbitration and thus, Brewer was not left without a 
practical remedy.161  Chief Justice Price also referenced several in-state and 
federal court cases that affirmed the enforceability of class arbitration waiv-
  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 23-24.  The court remanded the case to an arbitrator in order to evaluate 
the “propriety” of going forward with a class arbitration proceeding.  Id. 
 151. Id. at 26 (Price, C.J., dissenting).  One other judge joined Chief Justice Price 
in his dissent.  Id. 
 152. Id. (quoting Mid-States Paint & Chem. Co. v. Herr, 746 S.W.2d 613, 616 
(Mo. App. E.D. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 153. Id. at 24-25. 
 154. Id. at 26-27. 
 155. Id. at 27. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 26. 
 159. Id. at 27. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
15
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ers.162  In conclusion, the dissent would have held that public policy decisions 
regarding class arbitration waivers are best left to the legislature.163   
The holding in Brewer (I) is a clear continuation of several Missouri 
cases finding unconscionability due to the presence of a class action 
waiver.164  However, the reasoning employed by those cases was subject to 
major overhaul by the impending Supreme Court of the United States case of 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.165  
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
1.  Facts and Procedural Posture  
In 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an opinion re-
garding a California court’s decision to strike an arbitration agreement that 
included a class action waiver.166  The case, first called Laster v. T-Mobile 
USA,167 involved plaintiffs Vincent and Liza Concepcion against defendant 
AT&T.168  The Concepcions alleged that AT&T, which had advertised free 
cellular phones upon a customer’s agreement to enter into a two-year service 
contract, lured them into purchasing mobile phones.169  However, after the 
Concepcions agreed to do so, they were given “free” phones in a transaction 
that included sales tax of $30.22.170  The Concepcions believed that charging 
$30 in sales tax on a free phone was in violation of the agreement, and they 
sought to form a class action suit with similarly aggrieved purchasers.171  
  
 162. Id. at 28.  
 163. Id.  A second dissent, filed by Judge Patricia Breckenridge, stated that she 
believed the arbitration waiver was also enforceable.  Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissent-
ing).  However, she felt that discussion regarding the impact of Vincent was best left 
for the future, considering neither the majority nor Price’s dissent turned on it.  Id. 
 164. See Woods v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90, 99 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008) 
(adopting reasoning from the Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 
2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)); 
Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 314 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005). 
 165. 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
 166. Id. at 1745.  
 167. No. 05cv1157 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), 
aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d 
sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  The Laster 
and Concepcion cases were consolidated, and the published name of the case changed 
twice by the matter reached the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 168. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.  The sales tax was based on the retail value of the phone. Id. 
 171. Id. 
16
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AT&T argued that the purchase agreement clearly prohibited AT&T custom-
ers from forming a class arbitration suit and that the Concepcions instead had 
to pursue their claims individually.172  Furthermore, a revised version of the 
arbitration provision had recently been put into effect, offering $7,500 to cus-
tomers who succeeded in individual arbitration and were awarded an amount 
higher than AT&T’s last settlement offer.173  The Concepcions argued that 
the individual arbitration clause was unconscionable.174  
The suit was first heard in one of California’s federal district courts.175  
That court relied significantly on the “Discover Bank rule,” which was a test 
implemented by the California Supreme Court in response to ever-increasing 
usage of mandatory arbitration contracts that included class action waivers.176  
The purpose of the rule, according to the California Supreme Court, was to 
put a stop to “virtual [corporate] immunity” from consumer class actions.177  
If the three prongs of the test were met, the clause would be declared uncon-
scionable and therefore unenforceable.178  The three prongs were: “(1) 
whether the agreement [was] a consumer contract of adhesion drafted by a 
party of superior bargaining power; (2) whether the agreement occur[ed] in a 
setting [that] . . . predictably involve[ed] small amounts of damages; and (3) 
whether [the plaintiff(s) simply alleged] that the party with superior bargain-
ing power carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of con-
sumers out of . . . small sums of money.”179  
Examining the first element of the Discover Bank rule, the district court 
noted that the plaintiffs lacked the opportunity to negotiate the terms of the 
  
 172. See id. at 1744-45. 
 173. Id. at 1744.  A 2009 provision revision stated that AT&T customers who 
prevailed at arbitration would be eligible for a $10,000 award and payment of double 
the customer’s incurred attorney’s fees.  Id. at 1744 n.3. 
 174. Id. at 1745.  
 175. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1157 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 
5216255 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 
584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 176. Id. at *8.  
 177. Id. (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), 
abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  In this case, the consumer’s minimum cost of arbitration 
was $1700, which highly exceeded the amount in controversy, $30.  Id at *10, *10 
n.5. 
 178. See id. at *8.  The three prongs of the test embodied the requirements under 
California law of substantive and procedural unconscionability.  Shroyer v. New 
Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 2007).  If all three prongs 
were met, for purposes of state unconscionability law, the requirements for substan-
tive and procedural unconscionability would therefore also be met.  See id.  Even if all 
three prongs are not met, such a result would not necessarily warrant the conclusion 
that a particular clause is conscionable.  Id.   
 179. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *8. 
17
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agreement, and it was offered to them on a “take it or leave it” basis.180  The 
contract was one of adhesion, and even though the facts surrounding the case 
warranted only a minimal finding of procedural unconscionability, the first 
prong was considered met.181  The second part of the test required a showing 
that the matter at hand involved a predictably small amount of damages.182  
Because the current individual dispute involved thirty dollars’ worth of dam-
ages, the second element of the Discover Bank test was also fulfilled.183  
Moving on to the final requirement for a showing of unconscionability, the 
district court reinforced that plaintiffs must allege that the other party put a 
scheme in place to deliberately cheat its customers out of individually small 
amounts of money.184  No factual showing was necessary here, and because 
the plaintiffs did allege that AT&T was fraudulently cheating its customers 
out of small amounts of money, the third prong was also satisfied.185  The 
district court, in conclusion, held that because the three prongs of the Dis-
cover Bank test were shown, the class action waiver contained in the arbitra-
tion provision was therefore unenforceable, and AT&T’s motion to compel 
arbitration was denied.186  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the decision of the lower court 
and, in response to arguments raised by AT&T, engaged in a dialogue about 
the favorable terms later added into the arbitration provision by AT&T.187  
The appellate court reasoned that the $7,500 premium payment188 did not 
destroy the second element of the Discover Bank test because that prong fo-
cused only on whether damages are predictably small in a particular scenario, 
  
 180. See id. at *9. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at *9-10. 
 183. Id. at *10.  The court did reference the $7500 premium payment offered by 
AT&T to its customers who won at arbitration, but declared that the monetary efforts 
and time spent on individual arbitration were outweighed by the “minuscule benefits 
of arbitration.”  Id.  A reasonable inference to be made is that if a customer did not 
win at arbitration, he or she would be completely out of luck and in the hole for thou-
sands of dollars over a $30 claim.   
 184. Id. at *12. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at *14. 
 187. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub 
nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 188. The payment would only be made if the customer succeeded at arbitration 
and was awarded an amount greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer.  Id.  The ex-
pected result at arbitration would be an award of $30.22 (for the amount of monetary 
harm suffered), and thus, it was in AT&T’s interest to simply offer a settlement 
amount slightly higher than $30.22 in order to avoid paying $7500 to a single cus-
tomer.  Id. at 856.  The predictable result is that AT&T would simply pay the face 
value of the claim before arbitration, which was $30.22; but, this result does not alle-
viate the concern that AT&T would simply continue its harmful practices.  Id. 
18
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and in this case, the predictable damages were approximately $30.189  The 
Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the ruling of the district court.190  
2. The Majority Opinion 
AT&T appealed and the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari in May of 2010.191  AT&T originally claimed, inter alia, that the 
FAA pre-empted California’s Discover Bank rule regarding the unconscion-
ability of class action waivers.192  The effect of AT&T’s claim, if successful, 
was that the FAA’s general policy toward enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments would override the California unconscionability test as introduced in 
Discover Bank.193  
The Court began with a general background of the FAA and its sec-
tions.194  The Supreme Court first reiterated that the FAA’s section 2 savings 
clause did permit generally-applicable state law contract principles to invali-
date arbitration agreements; however, defenses that “apply only to arbitration 
or derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at is-
sue” cannot invalidate arbitration agreements (in which case the FAA would 
pre-empt state law).195  Similarly, if an existing state common law right is 
wholly inconsistent with the provisions of a congressional act, then the state 
right cannot be enforced.196  “In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy 
itself.”197  Finally, the Court declared that “the inquiry becomes more com-
plex” when a generally applicable state law contract defense, e.g. uncon-
scionability, is applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.198  
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia,199 held that it would be 
inconsistent with the goals of the FAA for a court to require the availability of 
class-wide arbitration.200  The Court listed several reasons in reaching that 
conclusion.  First, the majority reiterated that the over-arching purpose of the 
FAA was to ensure that agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to the 
agreement’s terms.201  But, a second goal of the FAA was to streamline pro-
  
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 859.  
 191. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010). 
 192. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011). 
 193. See id. at 1747. 
 194. Id. at 1745-46.  
 195. Id. at 1746.  
 196. Id. at 1748.  
 197. Id. (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 228 
(1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 198. Id. at 1747.  
 199. Id. at 1744.  
 200. Id. at 1748.  
 201. Id.  
19
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ceedings and produce an expeditious result.202  Concepcion, the majority ar-
gued, frustrated a primary purpose of the FAA – to accelerate proceedings.203  
Next, the opinion expressed concern with the three elements of the Dis-
cover Bank rule.204 When examining the requirement that the contract be one 
of adhesion, the majority noted that “the times in which consumer contracts 
were anything other than adhesive are long past.”205  The second element, 
which demands that damages be predictably small, was also unconvincing to 
the Court.206  Because California courts had previously ruled that damages 
amounting to even $4,000 would be considered “predictably small,” the re-
quirement was therefore “toothless and malleable.”207  Finally, the majority 
rejected the requirement that a consumer allege that the defendant employed a 
scheme to cheat customers, mainly because it was “limitless” and required 
only an allegation and no measure of proof.208  In short, the Discover Bank 
rule made it too easy for a court to strike a class arbitration waiver as uncon-
scionable.  
The majority also established that arbitration was not fit for the higher 
stakes that class litigation entails.209  For example, class arbitration would 
sacrifice the main advantage of arbitration in general – its informality.210  The 
arbitration process would then become “slower, more costly, and more likely 
to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”211  Additionally, the 
Concepcion court stated that it did not believe Congress intended to allow an 
arbitrator to decide the stringent procedural requirements associated with all 
class actions.212  The majority also declared that class arbitration “in-
crease[ed] risk to defendants”: a lack of multi-layered review in arbitration, 
combined with the narrow standards for judicial review of an arbitrator’s 
decision (based on misconduct, rather than mistake) could set a company 
back millions of dollars on a non-reviewable mistake by the arbitrator.213  
Finally, the opinion reiterated that a defendant would not likely “bet the com-
  
 202. Id. at 1749. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 1750 (“California’s Discover Bank rule . . . interferes with arbitra-
tion.”). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id.  
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 1752.  
 210. Id. at 1751.  
 211. Id.  The majority noted that the American Arbitration Association had 283 
class action arbitrations on record since 2009, yet not a single one “had resulted in a 
final award on the merits[;]” moreover, the average time from start to finish in one of 
those class arbitrations not decided on the merits was 630 days.  Id. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. at 1752.  
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pany with no effective means of review,” and additionally, Congress would 
have never allowed state courts to require class arbitration.214  
In response to the argument that enforcing class arbitration waivers 
would effectively immunize companies from small-dollar claims, the Con-
cepcion court declared that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is incon-
sistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”215  Be-
cause the Discover Bank rule stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” the Supreme 
Court held that the rule was pre-empted by the FAA, and the class arbitration 
waiver was not unconscionable and therefore enforceable.216 
3.  Thomas’ Concurrence 
Justice Thomas “reluctantly” concurred,217 offering his own textual in-
terpretation of the savings clause within section 2 of the FAA.218  His reading 
would clarify section 2 by using section 4, which states that a court must or-
der enforcement of the terms of an arbitration agreement “upon being satis-
fied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply 
therewith is not in issue.”219  Accordingly, Thomas would read section 4 and 
section 2’s savings clause harmoniously, resulting in enforcement of an arbi-
tration provision unless a party successfully asserts a defense relating to the 
formation of the contract.220  The concurring opinion determined that because 
the Discover Bank rule did not pertain to the making of a contract, yet was 
used to invalidate terms of an agreement to arbitrate, it was therefore pre-
empted by the FAA.221  Under Thomas’ reasoning, the class arbitration 
waiver should still have been enforced.222  
  
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1753. 
 216. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 217. Id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]hen possible, it is important in 
interpreting statutes to give lower courts guidance from a majority of the court.” (cit-
ing US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 411 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring)). 
 218. Id.  Thomas declared that his textual approach would usually produce the 
same result as the majority’s ruling.  Id. 
 219. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006)). 
 220. Id. at 1754-55.  Justice Thomas noted that valid defenses to the formation of 
a contract would include fraud, duress, or mutual mistake.  Id. at 1755.  However, 
“[c]ontract defenses unrelated to the making of the agreement – such as public policy 
– could not be the basis for declining to enforce an arbitration clause.”  Id. 
 221. Id. at 1756.  
 222. Id. 
21
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4.  The Dissenting Opinion  
Justice Breyer authored the dissent in the 5-4 decision.223  Citing Su-
preme Court precedent, the dissent affirmed that states may define uncon-
scionability as they wish, so long as the definition does not create a special 
rule disfavoring arbitration.224  Breyer looked to the Discover Bank rule and 
noted that it applied to any contract – including contracts containing class 
arbitration waivers and class action litigation waivers.225  Importantly, the 
Discover Bank rule also does not ban all class arbitration waivers, but instead 
bans only those agreements that fail general unconscionability standards.226  
The dissent further discussed that although arbitration’s procedural and 
cost advantages are often major reasons that lead parties to agree to arbitrate 
in the first place, the main goal of the FAA did not concern efficient resolu-
tion of claims.227  Congress also was not blind to the many advantages offered 
by arbitration; however, the FAA was not enacted to guarantee those bene-
fits.228  Rather, Congress’ primary objective was to secure the enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate by putting them “upon the same footing” as other 
contracts.229  Even if one of the basic purposes of the FAA was to ensure 
speedy resolution of claims, Breyer argued, class arbitration would certainly 
be preferable to the alternative: individually arbitrating hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of claims.230  In that case, the Discover Bank rule would actually rein-
force, not destroy, the purpose of the Act.231  The dissent ultimately con-
cluded that because the unconscionability test in Discover Bank treated 
agreements to arbitrate and agreements to litigate on the same level, it there-
fore fulfilled the requirements of the FAA.232    
  
 223. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 224. Id. at 1760. 
 225. Id. at 1757.  The majority agreed with that interpretation.  Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1757-58.  
 228. Id. (“Congress was fully aware that arbitration could provide procedural and 
cost advantages . . . [b]ut we have also cautioned against thinking that Congress’ 
primary objective was to guarantee these particular procedural advantages.”). 
 229. Id. at 1758. 
 230. Id. at 1759.  
 231. Id. at 1759-60. 
 232. Id. at 1762 (noting that this case does “not concern the merits and demerits of 
class actions; [it concerns] equal treatment of arbitration contracts and other con-
tracts,” and “[s]ince it is the latter question that is at issue here, I am not surprised that 
the majority can find no meaningful precedent supporting its decision”). 
22
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B. Missouri’s Application of Concepcion: Brewer v. Missouri Title 
Loans (Brewer II)  
1.  The Majority Opinion 
The majority decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion compelled 
the Supreme Court of the United States to also vacate the original ruling in 
Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans (I).233  The Court remanded the case “for fur-
ther consideration in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,”234 which 
prompted the Supreme Court of Missouri to reconsider its reasoning and the 
result reached in Brewer (I).235  This review served as the first application of 
the Concepcion case in the Supreme Court of Missouri.    
On remand, the Supreme Court of Missouri first returned to the facts 
and holding of Concepcion.236 In its view, the Supreme Court of the United 
States departed from Missouri’s traditional analysis of unconscionability in 
terms of substantive and procedural elements.237  Instead, the dictate from the 
United States Supreme Court was that lower courts should only consider un-
conscionable factors related to the formation of the agreement to arbitrate.238  
Any examination beyond those factors, i.e. substantive aspects, would no 
longer be necessary.239  
The Supreme Court of Missouri also declared that the current issue in-
volved whether the entire arbitration agreement between Brewer and Mis-
souri Title Loans was unconscionable.240  To consider only the unconscion-
ability of the class action waiver would constitute unequal treatment of arbi-
tration agreements, which is expressly prohibited by the FAA.241  Thus, the 
  
 233. Mo. Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer, 131 S. Ct. 2875, 2875 (2011) (mem.). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans (Brewer II) 364 S.W.3d 486, 487 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc), cert. denied,, (No. 11–1466), 2012 WL 2028610 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2012). 
 236. Id. at 487-88. 
 237. Id. at 492 n.3 (“While Missouri courts traditionally have discussed uncon-
scionability under the lens of procedural unconscionability and substantive uncon-
scionability, Concepcion instead dictates a review that limits the discussion to 
whether state law defenses such as unconscionability impact the formation of a con-
tract.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 493 (“Future decisions by Missouri's courts addressing unconscionabil-
ity likewise shall limit review of the defense of unconscionability to the context of its 
relevance to contract formation.”). 
 240. Id.  
 241. e Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 
2007) (noting that the FAA’s purpose is to put arbitration clauses on the “same foot-
ing” as other contracts). 
23
Smithson: Smithson: Delicate Balancing
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: SmithsonPaginated.docx Created on:  10/21/13 10:20 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:12 PM 
344 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
court looked to whether unconscionable elements were present in the forma-
tion of the entire contract to arbitrate.242 
In determining that there were such elements of unconscionability in the 
agreement to arbitrate, the court noted that Missouri Title Loans was in a 
superior bargaining position, the agreement was non-negotiable, and the 
agreement was difficult for the average consumer to understand.243  Despite 
its earlier declaration that only the unconscionable aspects relating to the 
formation of the agreement would be considered,244 the majority also delved 
into an examination of the substantive terms of the contract, classifying them 
as “extremely one-sided.”245 
In doing so, the court drew a distinction between the facts of Brewer and 
those in Concepcion.  In Concepcion, AT&T would shoulder the costs of 
arbitration in certain scenarios, and even offered to pay a large sum if the 
arbitrator awarded an amount higher than AT&T’s last settlement offer.246  In 
Brewer, however, Missouri Title Loans offered no such incentives.247  Arbi-
tration was required for any dispute at the cost of the customer.248  Addition-
ally, three experts in Brewer (I) stated that it would be nearly impossible for 
Brewer to obtain counsel for her case.249  There was no similar evidence in 
Concepcion.250  Although inability to retain counsel could not be a dispositive 
reason for invalidating the agreement to arbitrate, it was certainly relevant.251  
Brewer had no practical, viable means of even pursuing individual arbitra-
tion.252  The majority continued to note that a “particularly onerous” provi-
sion within the text of the arbitration agreement allowed Missouri Title Loans 
to pursue both arbitration and litigation, while limiting Brewer to only resolu-
tion through arbitration.253  In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
held that because no sane person would agree to the arbitration agreement, 
and because it was formed under unconscionable circumstances, the arbitra-
tion clause in the contract was unconscionable and unenforceable.254  
The Supreme Court of Missouri included a crucial footnote in its opin-
ion.255  Footnote three stated: 
  
 242. Brewer II, 364 S.W.3d at 493. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 492 n.3. 
 245. Id. at 493. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 495. 
 249. Id. at 493-94. 
 250. Id. at 494. 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 494-95.  
 254. Id. at 495-96. 
 255. See id. at 492 n.3. 
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While Missouri courts traditionally have discussed unconscionabil-
ity under the lens of procedural unconscionability and substantive 
unconscionability, Concepcion instead dictates a review that limits 
the discussion to whether state law defenses such as unconscion-
ability impact the formation of a contract.  In fact, in his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Thomas specifically delineated past precedent 
of the Supreme Court applying defenses relevant to the formation 
of a contract.  Accordingly, the analysis in this Court’s ruling today 
– as well as this Court’s ruling in Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., – 
no longer focuses on a discussion of procedural unconscionability 
or substantive unconscionability, but instead is limited to a discus-
sion of facts relating to unconscionability impacting the formation 
of the contract.  Future decisions by Missouri's courts addressing 
unconscionability likewise shall limit review of the defense of un-
conscionability to the context of its relevance to contract forma-
tion. 256 
The majority, by putting this footnote within the opinion, demanded that Mis-
souri courts henceforth limit analysis regarding the sufficiency of an uncon-
scionability defense insofar as contract formation is concerned.  This dictate 
officially changed the unconscionability analysis in Missouri courts.  
2.  The Dissenting Opinions 
Both Judge Fischer and Judge Price issued dissenting opinions in the 
second Brewer case.257  Judge Fischer’s dissent centered on the fact that the 
circuit court’s judgment was too narrow; had it been given the benefit of 
Concepcion, it would have been able to look at the contract as a whole.258  
Thus, Judge Fischer would have reversed the entire decision in Brewer (I) 
and remanded the matter for consideration at the circuit court level.259  
Judge Price wrote his own dissent, basing it upon the theory that the ma-
jority established a rule “directed solely at invalidating arbitration agree-
ments” (although the FAA requires that rules governing unconscionability 
must be applied evenly in agreements to arbitrate and in agreements to liti-
gate).260  Additionally, the majority based its reasoning upon Justice Thomas’ 
concurring opinion in Concepcion, although Thomas clearly stated that he 
joined in the majority opinion of that Court.261  Even when looking to prob-
lems associated with the formation of the contract, as Justice Thomas sug-
  
 256. Id. (citation omitted). 
 257. Id. at 496 (Fischer, J., dissenting) (Price, J., dissenting). 
 258. Id. at 496-97 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 259. Id. at 497. 
 260. Id. (Price, J., dissenting) 
 261. Id. at 499. 
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gested, Price argued that the Brewer (II) majority failed.262  He argued it also 
failed to meet the actual standards set forth by the Concepcion majority.263  
Judge Price reiterated that Missouri still requires a showing of both pro-
cedural and substantive unconscionability.264  The procedural element of an 
unconscionability test involves the formation of an agreement (reflecting the 
factors most important to Justice Thomas), but Judge Price argued that no 
unconscionable factors relating to the formation of the agreement were 
shown.265  Specifically, Brewer failed to prove that she did not understand the 
contract, she did not prove that the terms of the contract were actually non-
negotiable because she never tried to negotiate them, and she did not prove a 
disparity in bargaining power because she clearly could have taken her busi-
ness elsewhere and received different terms.266 
Judge Price then moved on to show that the majority’s reasoning also 
failed the standard set forth by Concepcion.267  The basic holding in Concep-
cion was that a state law may not single out and disfavor agreements to arbi-
trate.268  However, the majority rule in Brewer (II) did just that.  By ruling 
that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable partly due to the fact that it 
would be difficult for Brewer to obtain representation in individual arbitra-
tion,269 the majority “[created] a new ‘common law right’ to an attorney; ex-
tend[ed] it to a right to class arbitration proceedings; and then us[ed] those 
two new rights as a contract defense just to strike agreements to arbitrate.”270  
Such a result was “absolutely inconsistent” with the FAA’s goal of enforcing 
agreements to arbitrate individually.271  Thus, Judge Price would have en-
forced the agreement to arbitrate individually.272  Finally, he asserted that the 
majority refused to abide by the Supreme Court of the United States’ prece-
dent simply because it “disfavor[ed] the use of individual arbitration clauses 
in consumer contracts[,]” and that those decisions were better left to the legis-
lature.273   
  
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 499-500. 
 265. Id. at 501. 
 266. Id. at 501-02. 
 267. Id. at 503-04. 
 268. See id. at 499, 503. 
 269. Price noted that such a conclusion was inaccurate; in fact, under the Missouri 
Merchandising Act, a plaintiff may recover attorney’s fees and be awarded punitive 
damages if the circumstances were appropriate.  Id. at 504.  
 270. Id. at 503.  
 271. Id.  
 272. Id. at 504. 
 273. Id. 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
The status of Missouri unconscionability law is unclear.  In Brewer (II), 
the majority stated that based upon precedent in Concepcion, it would no 
longer apply the traditional substantive and procedural unconscionability 
test.274  Instead, the court opted to look at unconscionability arguments sim-
ply by whether such factors existed during the formation of the agreement, in 
accordance with Justice Thomas’ concurrence.275  However, whether this will 
be applied to every unconscionability claim – or merely those involving the 
FAA – remains a mystery.  
The third footnote within Brewer (II) is pivotal, and could easily be in-
terpreted to read in one of two ways: (1) unconscionability law in general will 
no longer be viewed in the lens of procedural or substantive unconscionabil-
ity, but rather in terms of unconscionability in the formation of the agreement 
alone, or (2) unconscionability law, as it is applied in situations invoking the 
FAA, will no longer be viewed in the lens of procedural or substantive un-
conscionability, but rather in terms of unconscionability in the formation of 
the agreement alone. 276  The first option generally seems more likely given 
that the footnote does not specifically mention that the new test applies only 
in the context of arbitration.277  Moreover, in a practical sense, if the new test 
did only apply to arbitration contracts, such a result would clearly run afoul of 
the FAA.  As stated in Concepcion, state courts are prohibited from forming 
rules that single out and treat arbitration agreements unfavorably.278  By 
changing the test and requiring proof of objectionable circumstances only in 
the “formation of the agreement” (i.e. the procedural side) when examining 
arbitration agreements – without having to prove the accompanying substan-
tive factors – the Supreme Court of Missouri has made it easier to invalidate 
arbitration agreements. The FAA undoubtedly precludes this.  Thus, the only 
possible reading of footnote three is that the landscape of Missouri uncon-
scionability law, in its totality, has changed.  
If the traditional substantive and procedural unconscionability test has 
been discarded, Brewer (II) presents a remarkable change in direction from 
historical application of the defense. Although the test is different, undesir-
able circumstances regarding “the formation of the contract” sound suspi-
  
 274. Id. at 492 n.3 (majority opinion). 
 275. Id.  Despite ruling in such a manner, the Brewer (II) majority continued to 
perform a typical substantive unconscionability analysis.  Id. at 493 (“The evidence 
also demonstrated that the terms of the agreement are extremely one-sided.”).  Such 
an examination would be unnecessary under the new holding. 
 276. See id. at 492, n.3; supra note 256 and accompanying text.. 
 277. Over the last decade, nearly every case involving a successful unconscion-
ability defense claim has involved arbitration contracts; thus, it is possible that the 
Missouri Supreme Court meant to limit its application to the arbitration arena. See 
supra Part II.C. 
 278. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).  
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ciously like the procedural requirement in past unconscionability analyses.279  
A Missouri court has only once invalidated a contract as unconscionable on 
the basis of procedural elements alone.280 
Traditional problems in the formation of an agreement for the purposes 
of an unconscionability analysis generally include superior bargaining power, 
form contracts presented on a “take it or leave it” basis, high-pressure sales 
tactics, and fine print.281  While in some scenarios, an unusually high pres-
ence of these factors could “carry the day” in an unconscionability analysis, 
we have seen many findings of unconscionability already that contain only a 
slight amount of procedural factors (where a significant portion of substantive 
aspects are shown).  When looking at past opinions, Missouri courts often 
accepted simple reasons for finding inherent procedural unconscionability in 
consumer contracts, often because the substantive elements were so perva-
sive.282  By striking the necessity of the substantive portion of an unconscion-
ability defense, consumers are not left with much to prove.  The obvious re-
sult is that agreements between consumers and companies have become eas-
ier to invalidate.  
Finally, if the only unconscionable elements that need to be proven re-
late to the formation of the agreement, at what point are there “enough” to 
justify non-enforcement of a contract?  Parties used to rely on the sliding 
scale presented in King Louie, but perhaps Missouri courts should now insti-
tute a minimum number of procedurally objectionable factors that must be 
met in order to make a finding of unconscionability.  For example, simply 
proving superior bargaining power and a “take it or leave it” form contract 
would not be enough.283  But, showing those elements along with the fact that 
a party is unable, for example, to secure a contract elsewhere with differing 
terms might be “enough” to invalidate a clause.   
The practical effect of making consumer contracts more susceptible to 
winning unconscionability claims is that the power to contract, and to be held 
to the terms of such contract, is diminished.  An unconscionability argument 
is often a losing one, and for good reason – courts have long respected the 
right of individuals and entities to enter into contracts with one another.  To 
declare a contract unconscionable is to say that one party was not fit to exer-
  
 279. See Repair Masters Const., Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Mo. App. 
E.D. 2009) (noting that procedural unconscionability “deals with the formalities of 
making the contract”). 
 280. State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 281. Id. at 857-58. 
 282. A possible reason for this could be attributed to the “sliding scale” interpreta-
tion offered in King Louie, which states that a court may still find a contract uncon-
scionable if a small amount of procedural unconscionability can be shown, but is 
heavily outweighed by substantive elements (and vice versa).  Funding Sys. Leasing 
Corp. v. King Louie Int’l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 634 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979). 
 283. As noted in Concepcion, those factors are characteristic of nearly all adhe-
sion contracts, which have gained immense popularity in modern times. 
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cise the right to contract; such judicial interference should be reserved for the 
most extreme scenarios.  By halving the burden of proving unconscionability, 
consumers can practically assert a successful claim by merely affirming that 
they entered into a contract with a corporation.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In virtually all unconscionability cases, one can see that Missouri courts 
have engaged in a delicate balancing act; on the one hand, courts strive to 
preserve the everlasting principle that individuals should be able to enter con-
tracts, even if they are unwise.284  On the other, there is a sense that certain 
weakly positioned parties need paternalistic courts to ensure that they are not 
being taken advantage of.  As years progressed, judicial protection of parties 
has increased, as have the levels of sophistication and education of parties 
who claim they deserve such protection.285  Many feared that the ruling in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion would incentivize corporations to simply 
insert class action waivers in all consumer contracts, which would effectively 
result in immunity for relatively small harms leveled against consumers. 
However, the Supreme Court of Missouri appears to have adopted Justice 
Clarence Thomas’ concurrence in the matter, and as a result, it created an 
entirely new unconscionability test to mitigate such fears.  One can only wait 
to see how Missouri courts apply this test and shape it for years to come.  
 
  
 284. First United Partners 9 v. Williams Meat Co. (In re First United Partners 9), 
58 B.R. 685, 690-91 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (quoting Smith v. Guaranty State Bank 
& Trust (In re Smith), 15 B.R. 691, 693 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)). 
 285. See Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 340 S.W.3d 126, 
129 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (en banc) (involving a successful unconscionability claim 
offered by a doctor). 
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